Polkadot referendum 1890 aims to lower staking barriers for

Polkadot is preparing a governance vote that could dramatically change its staking model. Referendum 1890 proposes that validators lock at least 10,000 DOT of their own funds, while making nominators unslashable and cutting the unbonding period to a few hours [1].

Key takeaways

• Validators must self‑stake a minimum of 10,000 DOT to remain compliant [1].
• If passed, nominators will no longer face slashing risk [1].
• The unbonding period would shrink from 28 days to 24‑48 hours [1].
• Rewards for validators’ self‑staked DOT will be added by mid‑June, with a one‑year vesting schedule [1].
• Non‑compliant validators risk “chilling” once the change is enacted, scheduled for May 31 [1].

Staking redesign details

The Polkadot team describes the proposal as a prerequisite for the next phase of its staking redesign, noting that OpenGov currently shows 100 % Aye support and that the vote is slated to take effect on May 31 [1]. Under the new rules, validators who fail to post the required 10,000 DOT self‑stake before the deadline could be “chilled,” meaning they would lose active status and associated rewards [1]. At the same time, nominators would become unslashable, allowing them to earn staking rewards without risking their principal if a validator is slashed [1].

In addition to the self‑stake requirement, the proposal shortens the unbonding period dramatically—from the current 28‑day lock‑up to a window of 24‑48 hours [1]. By mid‑June, the network plans to introduce rewards tied to the unlocked DOT that validators hold, but these rewards will vest over a year, aligning incentives with long‑term participation [1]. The change also anticipates phasing out the commission model, as stablecoins will cover operational expenses once the issuance buffer begins funding stablecoin payouts [1].

Why it matters

If enacted, the referendum would remove two of the biggest obstacles to broader staking participation: the risk to nominators and the lengthy exit time for staked assets [1]. By requiring a substantial self‑bond, validators assume the primary slashing risk, which could encourage more responsible behavior and improve network security. Faster exits and unslashable nominators may attract new participants who were previously deterred by the high risk and liquidity constraints. The upcoming vote, therefore, represents a pivotal step in Polkadot’s effort to redesign its staking economics and could set a precedent for other proof‑of‑stake networks.